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Summary  findings
Economic  policy  reform that creates  opportunities  for  Brock  demonstrates  that govermnent  guarantees  on
new productive  activities  often shifts  wealth from one set  existing  debt, combined  with the use of junior secured
of agents  toward another, creating reason for political  debt to finance  new projects,  would mitigate  the problem
pressure  against the reform.  of underinvestmient  in safe  projects and overinvestnent
Brock explores how government  financial  guarantees  in risky  projects.
secure the political  support of the reform's "losers."  The potentially  positive  role of government  financial
Government  guarantees  have  two effects:  guarantees  after economic  reform does not imply  that
They will probably lead to a bailout  of some firms'  prudental banking  standards  fail to apply during-a
obligations  to debtholders.  This bailout must be financed  period of economic  reform. If anything, prudential
by taxes on the cash  flows from old and new projects,  standards  are more important during  such a period. But
and tax collection involves  a resource  cosL  it does imply  that a financial  bailout may be a lagging
* The existence  of the guarantees  distorts  indicator of a successul policy  to offer financial
entrepreneurs' investment  incentives  by creating an  guarantees  to potential losers, so they wilH  support
incentive  to invest in overly risky  projects  and not to  reform.
invest in safe new projects.
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There is an historically important connection between economic policy reforms and financial
bailouts. For exarnple, periods of important  economnic  reform  in Korea in the 1960s  and Chile in the 1970s
were followed by significant govermment  interventions in the financial systems that involved debt
writedowns (in Korea following 1972 and in Chile following 1983). In the nineteenth century sustained
movements toward fee trade in the United States (following  the 1832 Compromise  Tariff Act) and Japan
(following  the forced  opening  of Japan in the 1850s)  were also followed  by financial  crises (1839-1841  in the
U.S. and 1872-76 in Japan).  Other episodes of economic policy reform that have ended with financial
bailouts  include  Chile (1956-1962),  Brazil (1965-1971),  and Argentina  (1975-198  1).
Early work  on modeling  economic  policy  reform  often aswmed the existence  of an appropriate  set of
lump-sum taxes and transfers in order to focus on the welfare costs of various government  policies. More
recent work on economic  policy reform  - including  Fernandez  and Rodrik (1991) and Alesina  and Drazen
(1991)  -- has focused  on the  "winners"  and "losers"  of policy  reforms. Models  of winners  and losers sidestep
the issue of transfer mechanisms that would compensate losers in  order to focus on the nature of
noncooperative  games tha prevent  heterogeneous  groups  of individuals  from agreeing  upon policy reforms.
In many of these models  potential  winners are politically  weak and cannot  push through  reforms that would
be adopted if winners  could  make side  payments  to losers.
This paper concerns the design of a transfer mechanism to facilitate economic policy reforms.
Unlike the literature on "winners"  and "losers"  of policy reforms,  the paper assumes  that no policy reform
can take place if any agent is made worse  off by the reform. Given this constraint,  a government  wishing to
undertake a potentially pareto-improving  policy reform must work within the parameters of the existing
mechanisms  for wealth  redistribution  without  the benefit  of lump-sum  taxes and transfers.
The paper's model is built around a two-period  endowment  economy in which "nonentrepreneurs"
lend to "entepreneurs" to finance investment  projects. A policy reform is assumed  to lower revenue from
projects already in existence,  but also to create investment  opportunities  for new projects whose revenue
would more than offset the lost revenue of the original projects.  The government can compensate
nonentreprus  for the added riskiness  of the existing  debt by providing  a debt guarantee  that is backed by2
the government's  ability to levy taxes.  The government's  guarantee  has two consequences:  first, with a
positive  probability  the guarantee  will lead to a bailout of finns'  obligations  to debtholders that must be
-financed by taxes on the cash flows of new and old projects, where tax collection involves a resource cost;
and second, the existence of the guarantee will distort the investment incentives of entrepreneurs, creating an
incentive not to invest in new projects or to invest in overly risky projects.
When choosing the mechanism to compensate nonentrepreneurs for the adverse effects of the new
policy on the value of their debt, the government must decide  whether or not to permit entrepreneurs  to
create new firms and, if not, whether to restrict new debt issued by existing firms to be equal in rank with old
debt, to secure new debt by new cash flows, or to grant a risk-free guarantee  to new debt.  The optimal
choice will minimize the deadweight cost of the transfer.
Section 2 develops the basic model.  Section 3 shows how the governments  garantee  distorts the
enrpreneur's  investment incentives.  Section 4 discusses the use of secured debt to align the entrepreneur's
incentives  more  closely  with  those of the  govermnent.  Section  5 examines  the effect  of government
guarantees on new debt as well as pre-existing debt.  Section 6 sketches reform periods in Chile (1975-1983)
and Meiji Japan (1872-1881) to illustrate the empirical applicability of the model.  Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
The model is a simple two-period general equilibrium endowment  economy that is based  on the
microeconomic analysis of secured debt by James (1988, 1989). The general equilibrium setting of the paper
is adapted from that of Bemanke  and Gertler (1990).  Unlike  either James (1988,  1989) or Bernanke and
Gertler (1990), there is a government in this paper whose policy choices form the focal point of the paper's
analysis.  In order to provide  the simpiest  possible  model to  explore  the  public  finance  link  between
economic policy reform, government loan guarantees, and financial bailouts the paper assumes symmeric
information  between  borrowers  and lenders.  Caveats conceming additional  issues raised by  asymmetric
information are discussed at the end of the paper.
The first period is the investment period and the second period is the consumption period.  There are
a countable  infinity  of risk-neutral  agents in  the  economy.  Entrepreneurs  are  able to  undertake  risky3
indivisible  investment  projects. Non-entrepreneurs  cannot undertake risky investment  projects. Agents in
each class of individuals are assumed to be identical so that the analysis  can be conducted in terms of a
single,  representative  price-taking  entrepreneur  and a single,  representative  price-taking  nonentrepreneur.  A
representative  entrepreneur  begins period 1  with an endowment  w, <1 invested  in a project  th has a payoff
of a/fs) in period 2.  The state of the world s is assumed to have a uniform  distribution  over the interval
[0,1]. The required  investment  for te  project is one unit  of endowment  so that te  entrpeneur  must obtain
additional  financing for the project from the nonentrepreneur.  This borrowing  can be thought  of as being
channeled through a bank holding company such as a Iapanese zaibatsu or a Latin American grupo
econdmico. A representve  n  begins  period I with an endowment  w. that is divided  between
debt (d) in the entrepreneurs  project and investment  (w,,  -a) in a safe technology  that pays a gross return  rfin
period  2 on any amount stored?1  Output of either the risky project or the safe investnent technology  is the
consumption  good for period.2.
Given the assumption  of risk-neutrality,  the expected  payoff to the nonentepreneur must equal the
risk-free  retun  rf:
fmin[rdo-  W  W),aI(s)Jf(s)&  = r,  (l-wI )  -w)
0
where rd  is the contracted  rate on debi The expected  period 2 income  of a repsentative  entrepreneur  is
E(y,)=  fai(s)f(s)ds-rf(l-w,)  (2)
0
while the expected  period  2 income  of a representative  nonntereneur  is:
E(yn) = Jminrddai(s)f(s)ds+r,(w.  -d)  = rfw,,  (3)
0
where d = 1- w,.  Equation (2) says that the entrepreneur's  expected  income is the expected  residual cash
flow from the project after the nonenrepreneur  has been paid. Equation  (3) says that the nonentrepreneur's
1Altrnatively, the nonenuepeeu  could  hold  some other  form of staecontingent  clm  on the entepreneur  that  yields
the expected  risk-free  return The key  distinction  in this  model  is between  intral  and  exutnal flnance,  n  on whether
the financial  contract  takes  a particular  fam of debt  or equity.4
expected income is the risk-free gross return on his endowment, part of which is invested in the risky project
and part of which is invested in the riskless technology.
In period I the govemment has an option to undertake an econoniic policy reform. 2 I assume that a
change in govemnent  policy will lower the expected period 2 cash flow from the existing project:
f(sfsd-  fa1(s)f(d(sd <  0  (4)
o  0
where  at (s)  is the cash flow in state s following the policy change.  An unexpected policy reform will result
in a loss in the value of the debt issued by the representative entrepreneur:
s * min[rd{(l  -w,),  a;(s)]f(s)ds  <r.  (I-  W.)  .(S)
a
In order for the representative nonentrepreneur to agree initially to invest in the first project he must be given
a guarantee that he will be compensated for losses arising as a result of changes in economic policy.  I will
assume that the reprsntative  entrepreneur and nonentrepreneur have agreed upon constitudonal safegards
that require the govemment to make such compensation3
The government has the auftority  to order the private recontracting of the existing debt contract in
conjunction with the proposed policy reform  If the reduction in the cash flow on the existing project is not
too large, an upward recontracting  of rd will compensate the nonentepreneur  for the lower cash flow and
greater  default  probability  of the project  In this  case,  there  is no additional  role  for public  policy  to
supplement the initial economic reform.  In what follows, I will assume that the expected value of the new
cash flow is strictly less than the riskiess rate so that recontracting wiU not solve the distributional problem
associated with the policy reform:
21  will  not attempt  to  model  why the govenmat  would  not have  undertaken  a reform  prior to the start  of period 1. By
now there  is a large liteHaure  on policy  reform  [see,  e.g.,  Krueger  (1990)  for a survey]  that  stresses  the difficulty  of
defining  "the  government"  as a benevolent  guardian. Even  when  a govement  is attempting  to  maximize  welfare.  it
may pursue  policies  due to 'govenmenL  failure"  that are not the best  polices.  Some  governments  do, however,  enact
policy  reforms  that  have [he  potential  to improve  welfare  if the private  sector  can be persuaded  to undertake  new
investments  that follow  the lead of the govemmenL
3With reference  to  footnote  l, this meas  that  the agents  can wite fincal  contracts,  including  simple  debt contracts,
that  arte  contingent  on the state of nature s, but that they  cannot  wrte contracts  contingent  on specific  policy  changes.
The pareto  criterion  is a simple  rule  that  solves  a potential  time consistency  problem  with  respect to  policy  reforms.5~~~~~~~~
(c,cs)fdsxds  c  rf (1-w).  (6)
a
As a result of this assumption,  the government  will be obliged to engineer a transfer to the representative
nonentrepreneur  to make  him no worse  off than  he was  before  the policy  change.
Benchmark  Analysis: Financing  of the New Project  by a New Finn
As a starting point for the analysis of the mechanics  of the transfer, I assume that the government
cannot take over the management  of the bankrupt bank holding company (only the entrepreneur  has the
knowledge to generate positive cash flows from the project).  In  order to make the representative
nonenrepneur  no worse  off as a result of the policy change,  the govemment  guarantees  the risk-free  rate of
return  on outstanding  debt, thereby  incuning the following  financial  obligation:
VO(s)  =  r4(l-W)-min[r,(l-Wc),ai(s)]  = max[O,rf(I-  wj-4(s)].  - (7)
Equation (7) states that as long as the cash flow of the first project exceeds  the nonentrepreneur's  claim on
the project the govemmenfs  obligaton is zero. Whenever  the cash flow of the first project falls short of the
claim of the nonentrepreneur,  the goverments  guarantee  obligates the government  to pay the difference.
Equation  (7) produces  a standard  result (e.g., Merton 1977)  that the government's  guarantee  is equivalent  to a
put option writte  on the value of the entrepreneur's  assets, where the value of the nonentrepreneur's  debt
claim is the exercise price of the option. Table 1 presents the balance  sheet for the original firm with the
government's  guarantee in place.  The guarantee  is an asset of the firm and is the reason the firm has a
positive net worth,  denoted by q0w,, where qo is the ratio of the market  value of the firm to the book value
of the firm (we).
Given the government's  guarantee the representative  entpreneur  will create a new bank holding
company to finance the new project  Under the assumption that the amount of the nonentrepreneurs-6
endowment  remaining in storage  exceeds the amount required for investment  in the new project, the rate on
new debt (rb)  must satisfy the following  no-arbiirage  condition:
J
Jmin[rb as(]f(s)ds  = rf,  (8)
n
where a2(s) is the cash flow in state s of the new project  In order to finance the govemments guarantee on
debt corresponding to the first project, the government taxes the representative entrepreneur with a state-
dependent head tax of To(s).  Due to costs of tax collection the government's revenue from the tax is only
(1- y)TO(s), where r is a multiplicative  parameter measuring  the the deadweight  cost of taxation.
There will be states of the world in which the govermnents guarantee to the nonentrepreneur  will
excee  its capacity to tax the entepreneur's cash flows. To cover those sttes  the govemment must purchase
a put option from the nonentepreneur paying max [O,Vo(s)-(l-7y)TO(s)J.  The government finances the
put option in the second period with a state contingent premium p[Vo(s) To(s)] that is payable in states of
the world in which the option is not exercised. The need for the government  to hold a put option  indicates
that the government's  debt guarantee  cannot  be unconditional. If the governent  chooses to combine the put
option with the existing debt, the existing debt will pay more than the riskless rate.  In the advent of a
sufficiently  bad state of nature in the second period, the put option allows the government to write down part
of the value of its obligation. 4 The Appendix  develops  the m  cs  of the government's  budget constraint
associated  with the put option.
The expected deadweight cost associated with collection of tax revenue to finance the expected
financial bailout will prevent the government  from undertakng some policy reforms that it would otherwise
undertake. Given the requirement  that the govemment  can only implement  pareto-improving  policy changes,
4A similar  characzation  is obhined  by Lucas  and  Stokey  (1983,  p. 74)  in the  context  of fiscal  financing  for  a wn
dhat  occus with a positive  probability  in the  futur  Lucas and Stoey's soluidon  is for the government  to purchase state-
contingent  bonds from the pivate sector that pay  i  die event  of a war  and zero oterwise.  These sta  contingent
bonds are idenical to put options. In Lucas and Stoke/s example,  the govemment  pays for the ste  contingent bonds
by issuing  state  contingent  govermment  debt  that  pays U (financed  with  tax  revenue)  if there  is no war  and  zero
ohwis  he finag  solution  in this  paper  for the  governments  guarantee  is simia to the one  obtained  by Lucas
and  Stokey  for state-contingent  wartime  expnaditure  and, as  Lucas  and Stokey  state,  the  solution  uinusntes  the risk-
spreading  aspects  of optmal fiscal  poLicy  under  Uncertainty)"-7
the cash flow from the representative  new project a2(s) must exceed the sum of the cost of Investment,  the
expected  capital loss  on the existing investment,  and the deadweight  cost of taxation:
(2sf(s)ds  - r  -[iat(fs)ds  - !a(sof(s)ds]  -f  T0(S)(s)ds  (9)
If the first three terms in equation (9) are positive, the new project will be welfare improving.  and a
govenment with access to a lump-sum  tax to finance the transfer to the nonentrepTreneur  should undertake
the economic policy reform.  Equation (9) indicates, however, that under the benclhmark  analysis of free
entry of new firms the government will be forced to forego  -some potentially welfare-improving  policy
reforms due to the deadweight  costs of tax collection.
3.  Debt Financing of the New Project by the Existing Firm
As  an  alternative  to  the.benchmark  scenario,  assume that  the government  constrains the
representative entrepreneur to finance the.  new project from her existing bank holding company.  The
entrereneur  will then be forced to issue new debt that compensates  the representative  nonentrepreneur  for
the risk associated  with the old debt of the firm:
5min{r,  A,*[r(s) +-a 2(s)]}f(s)ds  =  rf.  (10)
where r 8 is the contracted rate on new debt and A1 =  is the share of the firm's cash flows  that
rf (l-w,)  +r.
go to pay off the nonentreprenfeus  new debt claim  in the event of the firn's default.
The government's-guarantee  associated  with the policy is te  following:
V1(s) =  r1(1-w)-min{r 1(1-wj)  (l-A1)[a(s)+a 2 (s)]}
= max{O.  rf(l-wi)-(1-A)[4(s)+a21S)I}8
The expected value of the guarantee VI will be less than the expected value of the guarantee VO  if the
contracted rate on new debt (r1) of the existing holding company Is greater than the contracted  rate (rbJ  on
debt when the entrepreneurs can set up a new flnancial firm.  This will be true as long as the cash flow
Al  [al (s) + ac 2(s)] going to pay off the representative  nonentrepreneur's  new debt In states of default Is less
than the cash flow a2(s) from the new projecL
-The government will  finance  the guarantee with a  state-dependent  head  tax  T,(s)  on  the
entrepreneur.  As in the benchmark case, the government purchases a put-  option from the representative
nonentrepreneur  for states of the world in which tax revenues fall short of the transfer associated with the
debt guarntee.
When the interest rate on new debt issued by the existing  firm exceeds the Interest rate that would be
contracted by  a  new firm, the entry restriction lowers the government's cost  of  compensating the
nonentrepreneur  for the policy change. By reducing the deadweight  costs associated  with tax collection, the
restriction on entry may allow the government to undertake a policy reform that would be rejected by the
criterion of equation (9). This will be the case if
WAS)&r  - r  a  (s)f(s)ds  - fal  (sa  fs)ds-Tl(s)f(s)ds  > 0.  (12)
f~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~  Yf 0  0
Although a policy to restrict  the financing of new projects to existing firms  may lower the
deadweight costs associated with financing the goverunent's guarantee, the higher  interest rate on new debt
may cause the representative entrepreneur not to  undertake the new investment.  In particular, the
enepreneur  will not invest in the new project if the following  condition  holds:
Ja  (s)f(s)ds-  Jmin{r.,  A[4(s)+a2(s)]}f(s)ds - [Vo(s)  -V(s)]f(s)ds
0  ~~~0  0.
(13)
- 7a 2 (s)f(s)ds-rf  - [  Vs)Jf(s)ds  < 0.
0  09.
Equation (13) is the change In the entrepreneur's  wealth resulting from her decision to Invest  In the new
project when the new project must be financed by the existing financial holding company.  The term
[Vo  (s) - Vs)Jf(s)ds  represents the change in the expetedvalueof  go  ensguranteeonold
0
debt as a result of the  linvestment  Since  the second term in (13)Is just ihe risk rree rate, (13) Indicates  that
the representative entepreneur may not undertake the new project even if the cash flows are sufficient to
cover the cost of the new debt.
Table 2 presents the balance sheet  of the flrm,  showing  the government's  guarantee  on old debt as an
asset of the flrm.  The firm's net worth Is denoted by qlw, and the change In the firm's net worth,
(qe  -qo)w,,  is given by the terms In equation (13).  When the inequality In equation (13) holds, new
investment  lowers the firm's net worth and the government  is faced with a private sector underinvestment
problem. 'This  distortion of the entrepreneur's  investment  Incentives  is the same as the one first analyzed  by
Myers (1977) in the context of a firm. The underinvestment  problem refers to decisions  by owners  of firms
to forego positive net present value projects when the firms have outstanding debts. Myers shows in some
detail that the underinvestment  problem arises when new projects effect a wealth  transfer from stockholders
to bondholders  by reducing  the default risk of outstanding  debt.
In this paper, the added cost of the new investment  (r8 - rb)  --  produced by the prohibition on the
creation of a new financial fim  - does not represent a direct tansfer of resources to the nonentrepreneur,
since the expected  return to him Is the risk-free  return  The added cost of the new investment does create a
an expected transfer of resources from the entrpreneur to the government  by lowering the expected size of
the debt guarantee that the goverment  must finance  Equations (12) and (13) together show that a pair of
conditions interact to determine whether a potentially pareto-improving policy reform is  feasible:  a
resticdon on the creation  of a new financial  firm lowers the deadweight  cost of tax collection  by mixing  the
cash  flow of the new project with that  of the existing project, but this same restriction lowers the
entrepreneur's  incenfive  to undertake  the new project.10
Adding Risk to the New Project
Suppose, as in Gorton and Kahn (1992), that the entrepreneur can add risk to the new project at a
cost C. Assume that the risk takes the forn of a mean-preserving  spread:
a4(s)=  a 2 (s)  + e(S)  (14)
where
4e(s)I;  (s)J=  '  0  (15)
Given the cost of adding risk, the contracted rate on new debt of the holding company will be  r4 if the
entrepxeneur  decides to add risk to the project
Jmin{r,  A,[a,(s) +4(s)  - C]}f(s)ds=r.  (16)
0
*.
where  A2 =  is  the proportion of  cash  flows of  the holding company  that  go to  the
nonenrepreneur if the company defaults  on its debt obligations.
If the entrepreneur  decides to add risk to the new project, the value of the govemment's guarantee  on
existing debt will be the following:
V2(s)  = rf (1 - We)-min{rf  (1-w,),[l-A2]  [a;(s)+  al(s)-CJ}
(17)
- max{O,  r(-  WI)-1I-  [  (s)+ 4  (s) -C]
The entrepreneur will choose to add risk when it is profitable to do so. Equation (18) gives the condition
under which the entrepreneur  will choose to add risk to the new project:11
Ja2(s)f(s)ds  - min{r,.  4A  [a  (s)+ a (s) - C]}f(s)ds-c-J  [  -(s)-V 2Cs)V(s)ds
0  a  0
(18)
>  a2  (s)f(s)ds-  Jmin{r,,,At  [ani(s)  +  a2  (s)]}f (s)ds .
0  0
The first two terms on either side of the inequality in (18) are equal in value [from equations (9), (14) and
(16)]. As a result, equation (18) can be rewritten as follows:
F
; [V.(s)-VI(s)]f(s)ds  > C.  (19)
Equation (19) indicates that entrepreneur will find it profitable to add risk to the new  -project when the
expected value of the increase in the government's guarantee produced by adding risk exceeds the cost of
adding risk  The increase in the govemment's guarantee matches the decrease in the entrepreneur's  profits
that go toward paying off existing  debt claims in states of default.
Table 3 presents the firm's balance sheet if the firn  undertakes the risky investment. The firn's
assets are lowered by the amount  C by the choice of the risky investment, but the fium also has a new
guarantee, V2, as an asset.  The firm's net worth is denoted by q2w2 and the condition  at  the firm's net
worth increases as a result of the risky investment, (q2 -q)w,  > 0, is the condition given by equation (19).
If the entrepreneur  can add risk to the new project, the underinvestment  problem associated with the
entry restriction may be solved by risky investment, but only at a resource-cost C.  In addition, even when
underinvestment in the project is not a problem in the absence of the rislder project, the ability to add risk
may cause the entrepreneur  to pick the riskier project.12
4.  Financing  New Projects with Secured Debt
Smith and Warner (1979), Smltz and Johnson (1985), and James (1988,1989) have shown that the
use of secured debt to finance new projects reduces the underinvestment problem by lowering the wealth
transfer from shareholders to exisdng debtholders.  In this paper's model, the govenmnent can sinilarly
reduce the underinvestmnent  problem created by the entry restriction  by permitting the entrepreneur to issue
junior secured debL The return on junior secured  debt (r, 1) must sadsfy the following no-arbitrage  condition:
(min[r 4a,.(s)lf(s)ds = r,.  (20)
0
With junior secured debt the cash flow of the new project secures the new debt, but the cash flow in excess
of the contracted rate goes to the profits of the holding company, thereby lowering the expected cost of the
government's  guarantee below VO(s):
V3(S)= -r(1  -WC)  - nrf  (l - w),max[a,  (s),a  (s)+a*(s) -r  n1
(21)
=  max{O 1rf(1-.w,)-als)-max[o9a 2(s)  -TJV}
Vo(S)-  V3(5)=
(22)
max[0,rf(1-w)-c4(s)J-max{0,  r,(1-w)-a  (s)-max[0a2(s)-r 4 1} Ž 0.
In equation  (22), for example, if  rf(1-we)  were  100,  a(s)  were  90,  and  a2 (s)-r 4 were  5, then
VO(s)-V 3(s) would equal 5.
If securing the new issue of debt eliminates the underinvestment  problem, then the government will
tax the entrepreneur with a state dependent head tax and simultaneously  purchase a put option to cover the
ztates of the world in which the obligation associated with the guarantee exceeds the governments tax
reepts.  Compared to the benchmark  analysis, a limit on the creation  of a new financial firm combined with
the issue of junior secured debt offers an alternative that lowers the deadweight cost of tax collection.  In13
order for the new policy to be pareto superior to the status quo at the start of period 1. the following two
conditions need to be satisfied:
a2(s)f(s)ds  -rl  -f  [V 0 (s)- V3(s)]f(s)ds  Ž 0 and  (23)
0  0
a (s)f(s)ds - A  (s)f(s)f s - a(s)f(s)ds]  -y1 r3 (sf(s)ds  > O.  (24)
Condition (23) is required lfr the underinvestment  problem by the entrepreneur  not to occur. Table 4 shows
that the change in the firas  net wort,  (q  o  -q)w,  is given by the three terms in equation  (23).  Condition
(24) requires  at  the deadweight cost of taxation associated with the use of secured debt plus the expected
capital loss on the existing representative project be less than the cash flow on the new project net of its
finance cost.
5.  Government Guarantees on New Debt
If the govemment permits the entrepreneur  to establish a new firm and at the same time guarantees
the debt issued by the new firm, the value of the government's  obligation  will be:
V 4 (s)=  max[O,rf(1-wj)-a(s)]+max[O,rf  -a2(s)].  (25)
The value of this blanket guarantee wil  unambiguously  exceed the benchmark guarantee with entry of the
new financial firm. Because of the deadweight costs of tax collection to finance the expanded guarantee,  the
blanket guaratee  will be pareto-inferior to the benchmark guwaantee.
If the government prohibits the creation of a new representative financial firm but simultaneously
guarantees the new debt issued by the holding company,  the value of the guarantee  will be the following:
VS(s)=max[O,rf(l-w,)-at(s)+rf  -a2 (s)].  (26)14
The expected government Lransfer  will be greater than that associated with the limited guarantee on existing
debt (i.e., V 5 >  V, and V5 > V1) and may.  be less than or greater than the expected value of the benchmark
guarantee (VO). A government guarantee on new debt of the existing holding company wiIl lower the
government's obligation relative to the benchmark case when the new project has a low variance and is
negatively  correlated with the existing project.
Equation (26) emphasizes the importance of the entry restriction for the expected amount of direct
tax revenue that the goverment  must raise in order to compensate the nonentrepreneur  for losses produced
by the new policy.  Even with a blanket guarantee  on new as well as old debt of the existing representative
holding company, the expected fiscal cost of the guarantee may be less than that associated with allowing the
entrepreneur  to create a  new firn  to finance the new project without govemment guarantees while allowing
the government to guarantee the old debt of existing firms. Ensuring the debt of both new and old financial
finns is, of course, the worst policy for the welfare of the representative entrepreneur  and nonentrepreneur.
6.  Discussion
The standard approach to bank bailouts stresses the problems created by inadequate standards for
bank capital, poor supervision by bank examiners, and an unwillingness of regulatory officials to close or
recapitalize financial institutions that are in distress.  This approach is well represented in books such as
Benston et  aL (1986), in recent books on banking crises of the 1980s [such as White (1991) and Brock
(1992)], and in the World Bank's 1989 World Development Report on financial systems and development.
The regulatory problem addressed by the standard approach can in some circumstances  be described as one
of the "time inconsistency" of bank regulations: bank regulators and politicians cannot credibly precommit
themselves not to bailout banks in distress, so banks take actions that lead to financial bailouts. In this view,
good bankdng  regulation  in the form of capital requirements,  audidng, and timely closure or recapitalizaton
of banks serves to minimize the time consistency  problem.
This paper, in contrast to the standard approach,  has suggested that financial bailouts may be part of
a pareto-improving transfer mechanism that is associated with a growth-creating  policy reform. The model
developed in the previous sections should not be interpreted as stating that all (or even most) financial15
bailouts are pan of an optimal transfer mechanism. It does state that a significant economic policy reform
may involve government financial guarantees that, with a lag, produce a financial bailout which would
normally signal poorly-designed regulatory policy in a non-growth context.  This section skctches two
episodes of policy reform to illustrate the potential empirical applicability  -of the model developed in the
previous sections.
Chile, 1975-1983
In the early stages of its reforms (1975-1976)  the Chilean government attempted to promote a free
banking policy, in the sense of free entry and exit of banks (see de la Cuadra and Valdds 1992). The policy
was abandoned at the beginning  of 1977 when the govermnent  intervened to save the Banco Osomo, a mid-
sized banla and simultaneously  clamped down on the unregulated  financial  market. From 1977 onward most
observers agree that an implicit policy of deposit guarantees  existed for domestic depositors. Between 1977
and 1983,  entry of new financial firms was severely restricted  by the government.
Beginning  in 1976 the govenmment  began to encourage foreign  borrowing by domestic banks under
Article 14 of the Cental  Bank's Foreign Exchange Regulations. The capital inflows associated with Article
14 borrowing grew increasingly important to the success of the economic reforms.  By 1980 the inflows
reached 10 percent of GDP and then doubled to 20 percent of GDP in 1981.  According to the official
position of the Chilean govermnent at the time, Article 14 guaranteed foreign lenders only the right to
repatriate loan repayments at the going market exchange rate. There was no govermnent guarantee against
default
The external interest rate and commodity  price shocks  that hit Chile and the rest of Latin America in
the early 1980s  represented a particularly adverse  realization of the state of nature. On January 13, 1983 the
Chilean government took over the two largest banks in the banking system and suhsequently  announced  that
the government would assume responsibility for the foreign debt of all the banks.  Between 1983 and 1986
the government  engaged in two global reschedulings  of private sector debt and purchased large quantities of
uncollectable  loans from banks at par. During the perod from 1985 through 1990, most of the banks' foreign
debt was sold by the foreign lenders at deep discounts (at 60 to 70 percent of par) via debt buyback16
mechanisms and debt-equity swaps channeled through Articles  18 and  19 of the Foreign  Exchange
Regulations.
In terms of the paper's model, the Chilean government's 1977 intervention  accomplished two things:
it limited entry into banking that was destabilizing existing banks and it provided existing banks with a
mechanism for  financing  new  projects.  In  the paper's  closed  economy  model  the representative
nonentrepreneur  provides the additional funding, while in Chile foreign banks provided the new funds. In a
manner similar to the paper's model with junior secured debt, the government intervention in the financial
system following 1983  bailed out (most) domestic depositors, but it also involved a write down of the value
of foreign loans to banks.  Foreign loans, via the debt conversion mechanisms,  were effectively secured by
assets of insolvent but viable finns.
The paper's model predicts that for particularly bad realizations of the state of nature the government
will have to exercise a put option written by the representative nonentrepreneur. In an open economy,  such a
put option can be written by foreigners or international lendug organizations (and paid for by appropriate
premiums associated  -with the option). In 1983 the Chilean government was unable to finance the entire
financial  bailout out of current tax revenue and relied on stabilization  loans from the IMF and World Bank to
flnd a porwun  of the initial transfer. In addition, the Central Bank assumed the responsibility for financing a
large part of the transfer, and still holds $3.8 billion (about 13 percent of GDP) of debt associated with the
bailout.  This latter aspect of the bailout involves the smoothing of tax collections over many years by the
Chilean govemment, a possibility that does not fall naturally  out of the two-perod framework of the model.
With reference to the standard approach to banking crises, there is much evidence that banking
supervision was lax in Chile at least until the beginning of 1981.  Nevertheless, de la Cuadra and Valdds
(1992) find no evidence of rampant moral hazard (e.g., investment in overly risky projects) in the Chilean
banking system prior to the external shocks of 1981 and 1982.  Such evidence suggests that from 1977
through -mid-1981  government restrictions on entry into the banking system plus limits on the total amount
foreign borrowing created a positive charter value for banks.  This positive charter value -- in combination
with the government's treatment of foreign loans to the banking system as junior secured debt --  gave the17
banks the appropriate  incentives to invest in new projects that have been the basis of the successful  growth of
the Chilean economy since the mid-1980s.
Japan, 1872-81
During the early years of the Meiji restoration (1868-1876), the Meiji government faced two
problems:  a lack of private investment and a filscal  burden associated with the payment of stipends to the
samurai, a burden that absorbed half of the government's  tax revenue between 1871  and 1875 (Beasley 1972,
p. 381).  The lack of private investment was connected to the fragility of financial institutions.  In 1874 a
number of major merchants went bankrupt, and in March 1875 the four existing national banks asked the
government for assistance (Shibusawa  1910, p. 500). In order to rescue the banks, the government purchased
all of the depreciated bank notes at par in exchange for inconvertible government notes during the year
following  the request for assistance.
In  response to the joint  problems of the samurai  stipends  and  the  banks,  the goverment
implemented two interlinked polcies.  In August 1876 bank regulations were changed to  permit the
composition of bank capital to be 80 percent government  bonds and 20 percent specie (rather th  the 60/40
split prior to the change). One month later samurai stipends were commuted  into goverment  bonds. The
express purpose of the two policies was to reduce and to convert the government's obligation  to the samurai
into a form that would encourage private sector investment. Smith (1955, pp. 33-34) summarizes well the
the intent of the government's  policy:
Since the samurai problem was essentially economic, it called for an economic
solution, as every government document on the problem stressed.  There were but two
possible economic solutions, broadly speaking:  either the government had to support the
samurai as it had in the past on a kdnd  of dole, or it had to expand the economy sufficiently
to make room for them as producers.  The first of these alternatives was not seriously
considered since it would have saddled the government with a terrible financial burden and
forced it to  abandon the ambitious program of modernization to  which  it was fully
committed; expansion  of the economy,  on the other hand, was not only compatible with this
program but essential to it.  Solution of the samurai problem, therefore, was constantly
linked in official memoranda with industrial and agnicultural  development, particularly the
former.
Table 5 shows the great increase in the number of banks and in bank capital following the 1876
reform.  The contribution of the new banks to Japan's economy appears to have been favorable.  Patrick18
(1967, p. 259) concludes that "they [the national banks] made modem banking, and, by extension, modem
enterprise generally, a highly respectable and even prestigious  occupation; this probably resulted in part from
continuing general respect for the nobility and samurai."
In terms.of this paper's model, the Meiji reforms of 1876 were most.like the-benclhmark  model of
free entry with no government guarantee on new debt.  However. unlike the benchmark model, the 1876
government bailout occurred before the growth of new banks rather than after.  Given the small number of
banks, this may have been an attractive way to put old banks on an equal footing  with the new banks for new
lending (in the benchmark model old firms do not make new loans).  Another difference between the Meiji
reforms and the paper's model concems the treatment of nonentrepreneurs. Whereas the division between
entrepreneurs and nonentrepreneurs is a fixed element of the model, the Meiji government's compensation
poucy toward the samurai encouraged  them to become entrepreneurs by making entry into banking easy for
thenL The government bonds used by the samurai to establish new banks were secured by the cash flows of
new loans and were not given a govemment guarantee,  just as in the benchmark model..
7.  Conclusion
The theory of secured debt issue by firms emphasizes that a viable explanation of secured debt
cannot keep the investment policy of a firm fixed.  With a fixed investment policy, as assumed in the
Modigliani-Miller (1958) and Fama-Miller (1972) models,.the unexpected issue of secured debt transfers
wealth away from existing debtholders and toward firm share-holders. As a result, debt covenants written to
protect existing debtholders will in equilibrium prohibit the issue of secured debt. It is only when a firm has
new profitable investment opportunities that secured debt serves a function.  Without the ability to issue
secured debt to finance new investments, the conflict between existing bondholders and shareholders will
cause shareholders  to forego some positive present value projects due to the underinvestment  problem.
In a way that is similar to the theory of secured debt issue, unexpected policy changes in this paper
transfer wealth away from existing debtholders  -and toward entrepreneurs.  The assumed constitutional
safeguard of this paper that requires the government to compensate  agents for financial losses produced by
policy reforms assures that in equilibrium investment  in the original project takes place.  Like the theory of19
secured debt issue by firms, the paper's explanation of government policy toward old and new private sector
debt is not a viable theory  when the investment  opportuniLies  of a country are held fixed. It is the presence of
new investment options following an economic reform that creates the role for the use of secured debt by
finns or for government guarantees on new private sector debt.
A striking feature or the two cases of policy reform sketched in this paper - apart from the concerted
efforts of both governments to influence the debt structure of the banking systems -- is the central role that
economic growtlz played in the rhetoric of the political regimes. The Meiji government adopted the slogan
"enrich the country, strengthen the army" (Beasley 1972, p. 379) while the Chilean government embraced a
policy of "the seven modernizations" to transform  the Chilean economy. It is to these growth environments
that this paper's  interpretation  of the function of government  guarantees and financial bailouts applies.
As mentioned at the outset, the paper's model has not included asymmetric information between
lenders and borrowers, moral hazard, collateral, or monitoring mechanisms that play central roles in a
number of  recent  models of  banks in a  macroeconomic setting  [e.g., Diamond and  Dybvig (1983),
Williamson  (1987). Jacklin and Bhattacharya (1988) and Bernanke and Gertler (1989,  1990)].  The
contracting constraints associated with the existence of asymmetric information between borrowers and
lenders provide additional reasons for some types of entry restrictions to create charter value for banks, the
use of junior secured debt, and much attention to prudential regulation following economic  reforms. Unlike
the model in  the paper, financial bailouts are not costless due essentially to problems of  asymmetric
information.
The primary message of this paper is not that prudential bank regulations should be ignored during
policy reforms.  If  anything, bank supervision and monitoring capabilities must be strengthened if  a
goverment  is to successfully  pursue the financial policies outlined in the paper. Without strong prudential
supervision, the presence of asymmetric information may permit excessive risk taking, as shown in Section
4.  The message of the paper is also not that fiscal reform should be ignored at the outset of a policy reform.
In both Meiji Japan and Chile the governments undertook major fiscal reforms in order to improve tax
collection and to alter the tax structure to create smaller economic  distortions. Lowering  the deadweight cost
of tax collection may well be a prerequisite for a government's ability to credibly offer the financial20
guarantees modeled in this paper. The paper's primary message  is that a financial bailout may be a lagging
indicator of a successful policy to offer financial guarantees to potential losers in order to create political
support for an economic reform.21
Appendix: The Government's  Put Option Associated  with the Debt Guarantee
For any state of the world s, the governmenfs budget  constraint is the following:
Vo(s)+p[VN(4oTo(s)]  =(l-r)To(s+max[O,Vo(s)-(l-r)TO(s)].  (A.1)
In  "bad"  states  of  the  world  p[Vo(s),T&(s)]=O  and  In  "good"  states  of  the  world
max[0,Vo(s)-(I  - y)TO(s)] =0.  Let the states of the world in which the government exercises the put
option (i.e., the bad states) be ordered from 0 to  s  and those states in which the government does not
exercise the put option (i.e., the good states) be ordered from  3 to Y. Risk neutrality and the government's
budget constraint implies that the market value in period one of the put option, P(VO,  TO),  will satisfy the
following  two equalities:
f [([  - y)TO(s)  - VO  (OJf(s)ds  f  Jp  [V,(s).  T0(s)]f(s)ds =  P(Vo,  TO)
S  S
f  [(I- Y)T"(S-  V' 1 fsds  - - V,(s)-(1 - r)TO(s)]f(s)ds=  -P(VD,TO).  (A.3)
0
Equation (A.2) states that the expected value of the premiums paid by the government to the representative
nonentrepreneur  will equal the expected  excess of taxecs  relative to transfers in good states of the world in the
second.period. Equation (A3) sttes  that the expected fiscal shortfall in bad stats  of the world in the second
period will be equal to the expected payment to the govemment by the representative  nonentrepreneur. The
market price of the put option will equate the expected value of the premia in good states of the world in the
second period with the expected value of the fiscal shortfall in bad states, thereby generating the following
equality between expected tax revenue (net of  the cost of tax collection) and expected transfers across all
states of the world:
I
J[cl-rTa(<s)  - V0 (s)]f(sds=O  (AA)22
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0  0Table 5
Number, Total Paid-In Capital, and Average Capital of National Banks
in Japan,  1873-1880
(capital in thousand yen)
Average
Year End  Number  Total Capital  Capital
1873  1  2,441  2,441
1874  4  3,432  858
1875  4  3,450  863
1876  5  2,350  470
1877  26  22,986  406
1878  95  33,596  168
1879  151  40,616  152
1880  -151  43,041  168
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